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Introduction
Capital gains taxation has long been identified as a potential obstacle for the efficient allocation of capital (e.g. Feldstein & Yitzhaki, 1978) . Being generally paid upon realization, capital gains taxes impose payments on vendors of stock which these could have deferred otherwise. The resulting lock-in effect raises the vendor's reservation price and makes a sale less attractive (e.g. Holt & Shelton, 1962; Landsman & Shackelford, 1995) . These considerations have direct implications for corporate acquisition activity. Capital gains taxation reduces the net gain of an acquisition deal from the perspective of the vendor firm by triggering a high tax liability on accrued capital gains that have been retained in the target firm. To compensate for this, the vendor demands a higher price and, as a consequence, the deal becomes less attractive and may even fail.
Despite the potentially high relevance of the lock-in effect, the empirical literature has, to a large extent, ignored the impact on acquisition activity of capital gains taxes paid by corporations. In this paper we close this gap by providing empirical evidence on how capital gains taxation on the corporate level affects the number and volume of inter-corporate mergers and acquisitions (M&As). An important aspect of estimating the quantity rather than a price effect of capital gains taxation is that we can relate the former to observed synergy gains from M&As and determine the potential of corporate tax reforms to be efficiency enhancing in the market for corporate control. Previous studies have pointed to increased productivity (Devos et al., 2009) , knowledge spillovers (Bresman et al., 1999; Bena & Li, 2014) as well as increased management efficiency (Manne, 1965; Wang & Xie, 2009 ) and discipline (Scharfstein, 1988; Sapra et al., 2014) as important sources of gains that result directly from M&A deals.
The eminent literature has frequently focused on the price effect of capital gains taxes to provide evidence for a lock-in effect of individual shareholder taxation. Landsman & Shackelford (1995) use individual shareholder records from the 1989 RJR Nabisco leveraged buyout to show that shareholders with a higher capital gains tax payment demand higher compensation. Dai et al. (2008) disentangle the lock-in and the capitalization effect of capital gains taxes on US stock prices. With regard to M&As, Ayers et al. (2003) employ firm-level variation in capital gains tax payments resulting from M&A deals on American stock exchanges and control for institutional ownership to estimate a significantly positive effect of capital gains taxes on acquisition premia. They also find that increasing capital gains tax rates on the shareholder level deplete acquisition activity on the US stock exchange (Ayers et al., 2007) .
Most of these studies identify the lock-in effect by exploiting variation at the firm level.
1 This approach is infeasible when analyzing the quantity effect. Instead, internal validity has to be established by panel estimation methods. In our analysis we rely on several exogenous tax reforms at different points in time which provides a feasible way of identifying a causal relationship. We further exploit that these reforms did not affect M&A deals where the decisive shareholder was not incorporated and utilize these deals as a control group in additional estimations. Our estimations use the Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood (PPML) estimator that is particularly suited for our count data sample and also allows us to include fixed effects.
Our empirical results suggest that a one percentage point decrease in the tax rate for the sale of substantial corporate shareholdings raises the number of deals by 1.1% per year. The same result is obtained when measuring acquisition activity in terms of total deal volume. We therefore provide evidence of a significantly negative effect of capital gains taxes on corporate acquisitions which is robust to a range of model specifications. The causal relationship underlying our result is further verified when using deals with unincorporated vendors as a control group. We show that corporate capital gains tax reforms exclusively affect inter-corporate acquisition deals suggesting that our results are unlikely to be driven by confounding variables. Relating our main coefficient estimate to observed synergy gains from M&A deals we estimate the efficiency loss in the market for corporate control resulting from corporate capital gains taxation to amount to 3.06 bn USD per year in the United States.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present a simple model to analyze the lock-in effect in the case of inter-corporate acquisitions. Section 3 describes tax and acquisition data and provides the econometric approach. We describe the results in Section 4 and conclude in Section 5.
The Lock-in Effect for Corporate Acquisitions
The following model serves to clarify the relationship between capital gains tax rates and inter-corporate acquisition activity via the lock-in effect on the vendor's reservation price. 2 We consider an acquisition deal where some vendor firm owns a target firm and is offered the possibility to sell it to an acquiring firm. To simplify the exposition, we consider all participating entities to be incorporated.
Assume that the vendor company holds shares in the target with a discounted after-tax cash flow per share of 1 − τ V D. τ V is the effective tax rate from the vendor perspective. If the vendor company sells the target, it receives a deal price of P S per share. For simplicity, we assume that the vendor bought the target firm at
1 The exception in this regard is Ayers et al. (2007) who use time-series data for the Unites States.
2 The setup of the model follows classic approaches to modeling M&A taxation such as the one used in Becker & Fuest (2011). zero cost, such that P S is identical to the capital gain per share realized through the deal and taxed at the capital gains tax rate τ CG . The vendor company accepts the deal if the net revenue allows it to buy assets that provide an after-tax cash flow that is larger or equal to the one received from the target such that P S must satisfy
An implicit assumption underlying this condition is that the vendor reinvests the revenue from selling the target into an asset which generates an identical after-tax cash flow which is equivalent to assuming perfect capital markets. Though of simplifying nature, this assumption allows us to isolate the lock-in effect. Assuming a reinvestment in shares, we abstract from any mode of payment effect that occurs if the deal triggers a change in the cash flow received by the vendor which could potentially be related to a difference in tax treatment (e.g. Ohrn & Seegert, 2015) . Then, the vendor's reservation price is given by
(1)
is equal to the expected after-tax cash flows if and only if τ CG = 0. A positive capital gains tax rate raises the reservation price above the value of the after-tax cash flow of the target. More generally, the capital gains tax imposes an additional tax burden on the act of selling the target which ceteris paribus makes the deal less attractive from the vendor perspective.
Turning to the acquiring company, we assume that it is able to increase the discounted cash flow from the target by ∆ (e.g. through better management or advanced technology). The after-tax return per share of the target from the acquirer's perspective is then given by 1 − τ A (D + ∆) where τ A is defined as the effective tax rate faced by the acquiring firm. τ A comprises profit taxes but also the potential deduction of financing costs and taxation arising from the repatriation of profits in the case of a cross-border deal. The acquisition is financed by a reduction of credit market investment or an increase in borrowing. Then, the acquirer's reservation price is given by
For simplicity, we assume that any deal that generates a positive net gain is completed.
3 More specifically, we assume that acquirer and vendor firm are able to ne-gotiate a price that allows them to somehow share the resulting gain and make the deal beneficial for both companies. The deal is therefore completed if and only if
from which we can derive the cutoff level of synergy∆ above which the deal is always completed
For the moment, let us ignore the differences in effective taxation between the acquirer and the vendor (i.e. τ A = τ V ) so that φ = 1. It is apparent from (3) that without capital gains taxation we have∆ = 0 so that all acquisitions with a positive economic gain are completed. In contrast, a positive capital gains tax rate requires higher synergy gains to compensate for the tax payment resulting directly from the deal.
In the market for corporate control, there is a finite number of possible targets with synergy gains continuously distributed on the interval ∆ ∈ ∆,∆ , a cumulative distribution function F and a corresponding probability function f . Under the assumption that∆ is interior, all deals with ∆ ≥∆ are completed. We can thus define the number of deals as
As long as F is continuously differentiable and strictly increasing, we have
so that an increase in the capital gains tax rate decreases the number of acquisitions.
This is commonly referred to as the lock-in effect of capital gains taxation on market activity (e.g. Feldstein & Yitzhaki, 1978) . Intuitively, the capital gains tax imposes a transaction cost that reduces the net gain resulting from the inter-corporate acquisition deal.
In our exposition above we have defined n as the number of completed deals. It is, however, straightforward to reformulate the model such that n represents the total volume of all completed deals. As the economic impact of M&As may well depend on the actual size of the deals rather than the absolute number, we measure acquisition activity both as the number and the total volume of deals in our empirical estimation.
taxation on aggregate acquisition activity.
Empirical Approach

Capital Gains Taxation of Corporations
Corporate capital gains are usually taxed proportionally to the general corporate tax rate. Regarding capital gains realized through the sale of shares, the majority of countries tax cash payments and allow for deferral in the case of stock-for-stock deals. In the following analysis we focus on M&A deals that involve some sort of cash payments for two reasons. First, even though there often exists a preferential tax treatment of stock-for-stock deals, the large majority of acquisitions is still paid in cash, mostly for non-tax reasons (see Erickson, 1998) , and taxes are probably relevant for the choice of payment only at the margin (Ayers et al., 2004 The reforms occurred in different points in time and the resulting tax cuts differed substantially across reform countries and even more so when compared to non-reform countries where corporate capital gains tax rates sometimes decreased in the course of general corporate tax reductions. Figure 1 displays the changes in corporate capital gains tax rates for all countries in our sample. It becomes apparent that the decrease in capital gains tax strongly exceeds the corporate tax reduction in the reform countries, particularly in those that have introduced a full exemption. Thus, even if controlling for general corporate tax changes, we employ a rich variation in the tax rates to it by taking the median number of days between announcement and completion across the deals with available data in the same year and country and adding this duration to the announcement date provided.
8 Table 2 provides an overview of the deals included in our estimation. It reports the number and volume of deals by residence country of the vendor company. In total, we consider 30,545 acquisitions with a combined volume of 1,106.08 bn USD. In most of these deals, the vendor resided in one of the largest economies (i.e. United States, the United Kingdom, Japan and Germany) but the completion of deals is also substantial in number and volume in several smaller countries such as Finland and Sweden, where corporate capital gains tax reforms may have affected acquisition activity.
7 To ensure robustness, we re-estimated our model including listed targets and obtain similar results.
8 We conduct a robustness check by computing the time between announcement and completion using nearest neighbor matching. In particular, we take the power-distance weighted average over the five closest deals regarding announcement within the same country. Results are displayed in Table  A 
Estimation
In our empirical analysis, we estimate a reduced form of expression (4). We model the number and volume of acquisitions as a non-linear function of the corporate capital gains tax rate and a range of control variables:
where n it denotes the number or total value of acquisitions, τ
CG it
is the corporate capital gains tax rate, X it denotes a vector of control variables and φ i and φ t are country-and year-fixed effects, respectively. The model is estimated using the Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood (PPML) estimator. Besides being widely used in the analysis of count data, Silva & Tenreyro (2011) have shown that PPML is also well suited for (but not restricted to) analyzing data with a substantial number of zeros. The PPML specification includes time and country fixed effects to account for time trends and unobserved variables that are constant over time but differ across countries.
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As we have noted above, the corporate capital gains tax rate is usually closely linked to the standard tax rate (CT ) for corporations. We thus also include the latter in the estimation to capture any changes in acquisition activity related to corporate tax changes. Furthermore, we include a set of control variables that may influence acquisition activity on the aggregate level. These include GDP, the annual growth rate of GDP (see Erel et al., 2012; Rossi & Volpin, 2004) , inflation, the trade ratio 10 , as well as the size of the stock market (Di Giovanni, 2005) and credit available for corporate acquisitions. In addition, we control for the size of the service sector and institutional quality on the country level measured by the Corruption Perception Index (Hebous et al., 2011) . The latter also serves as a proxy for the level of shareholder protection.
In line with previous research, we lag the macroeconomic variables by one period to reflect that the decision makers' information set is based on completed rather than contemporaneous periods and to mitigate potential endogeneity problems. Table 3 provides summary statistics of all variables. A detailed description of all controls and their sources can be found in Table A .1 in the Appendix.
Results
In Table 4 we present the results of our estimation with regard to the number of M&A deals. Column (1) depicts our main specification. We obtain a coefficient of 9 See Fally (2015) for a feasible implementation of fixed effects in the PPML model. 10 The trade ratio is defined as the share of total exports and imports in GDP. Regarding control variables, more output growth, international trade, a higher level of governance quality and a better access to credit significantly increase the number of M&As. As in Di Giovanni (2005) , larger financial markets are positively correlated with the number of acquisitions. Similarly, larger service sectors indicate higher M&A activity. In contrast, inflation is negatively related to acquisition activity as the economic insecurity related to high inflation rates potentially discourages M&As.
The coefficient for GDP is insignificant, perhaps reflecting that both high and low levels of GDP may increase acquisition activity 11 within one country since M&As are used for expansion in economically favorable environments and to consolidate sectors in times of economic contraction. In our estimation the corporate tax rate does not significantly affect corporate acquisition activity. This suggests that from the vendor perspective the impact of corporate taxation is mainly related to the lock-in effect resulting from capital gains taxation. Estimation with PPML. The dependent variable is the number of M&A deals per year and country in which a corporate vendor sells shares in a target firm residing in the same country and receives a consideration that involves a cash payment. Regression (1) contains the main specification. In regressions (2) countries which are referred to as preferred holding locations are excluded. Regression (3) excludes all country-year pairs with zero acquisitions. Regression (4) extends the main specification by controlling for industry specific shocks whereas in regression (5) the interest rate on government securities is included as an additional control. Regression (6) controls for the lagged share of deals with foreign acquirers. All regressions include country-and year-fixed effects. Cluster robust standard errors (clustered at the country level) are provided in parentheses. Stars behind coefficients indicate the significance level, * 10%, * * 5%, * * * 1%.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Table 5 . Again the coefficient for the capital gains tax rate is significantly negative. With a magnitude of -0.011 in 12 Smith (2011) reviews the relevant rules in these countries in more detail. 13 Similar results are obtained when including the contemporary share of foreign acquirers, the number and the volume of deals with foreign acquirers.
14 For the effect of cross-border tax differentials on the reservation price of foreign acquirers see Huizinga & Voget (2009) .
15 For example, the legislative proposal for abolishing the taxation of corporate capital gains in Sweden in 2003 also contained a participation exemption for withholding taxes on dividends paid to non-residential companies.
our main specification in column (1) it suggests that decreasing the corporate capital gains tax rate by one percentage point should increase the total volume of acquisitions by 1.1% per year. Thus, our results regarding the quantity of the lock-in effect caused by corporate capital gains taxes cannot simply be explained by a change in the size of M&A deals but reflect a decrease in real acquisition activity.
The corporate tax reforms that provide the main source of variance in our estimation should generally not affect acquisitions where the vendor is not incorporated which makes these deals a useful comparison group to verify the causality of our estimates. This allows us to test whether it is the change in the corporate capital gains tax rate that affects acquisition activity or some coinciding regulatory measure that provides incentives for corporate investment. Whereas the latter should affect all acquisitions independent of the vendor's tax status, the former is only relevant for corporate vendors.
In a first step, we conduct a simple acid test using the number of acquisitions with non-corporate vendors 16 as the dependent variable. Results are presented in column
(1) of Table 6 . As expected, changing the corporate capital gains tax rate has no effect on the number and volume of these deals corroborating that the coefficient of capital gains tax in the benchmark regression indeed captures a causal effect.
An alternative approach to verify the causality underlying our estimation results is to use the number of deals that involve an unincorporated vendor as a control group in a pooled regression. In a triple difference-in-difference approach, this allows us to estimate the effect of a change in the corporate capital gains tax rate on acquisition activity involving only corporate vendors relative to acquisition activity involving unincorporated vendors. The latter should be less affected by capital gains taxation on the corporate level. Thus, we estimate a model of the following form
where n ijt indicates the number of deals in country i at time t for vendor type j. With regard to the vendor type we sort deals into two groups. V EN jit = 1 indicates deals with vendors that are fully affected by corporate capital gains taxes (type-C deals)
and V EN jit = 0 indicates those deals that are mainly affected by individual taxation (type-I deals). 17 P OST it is a dummy variable that indicates whether at some point t − s, s > 0, there was a substantial reduction in the corporate capital gains tax rate Estimation with PPML. The dependent variable is the sum of all values of M&A deals per year and country in which a corporate vendor sells shares in a target firm residing in the same country and receives a consideration that involves a cash payment. Regression (1) contains the main specification. In regression (2) countries which are referred to as preferred holding locations are excluded. Regression (3) excludes all country-year pairs with zero acquisitions. Regression (4) extends the main specification by controlling for industry specific shocks whereas in regression (5) the interest rate on government securities is included as an additional control. Regression (6) controls for the lagged share of deals with foreign acquirers. All regressions include country-and year-fixed effects. Cluster robust standard errors (clustered at the country level) are provided in parentheses. Stars behind coefficients indicate the significance level, * 10%, * * 5%, * * * 1%.
(1) in country i. In this case P OST it is equal to 1, otherwise it is zero. We identify the relevant tax cuts according to the reforms listed in Table 1 (e.g. in the case of Italy, P OST it = 1 from 2004 onward and zero before).
In equation (6), γ 1 measures the expected additional rise in the number of type-C deals relative to the number of type-I deals that is caused by the existence of a substantial corporate capital gains tax exemption. Column (2) in Table 6 displays the estimation results. As expected, the coefficient of V EN jit × P OST it is positive and highly significant. The estimated coefficients suggest that the presence of a corporate capital gains tax reduction increases the ratio of the number of type-C and type-I deals by a factor of 2.05. One explanation for this result is that a lower corporate capital gains tax rate makes firms with corporate shareholders only a more attractive target for acquisition relative to firms where potential deal participants include individual shareholders that do not benefit from the corporate capital gains exemption. This further supports the causal inference of our results and also provides a tax-related reasoning for the observed dominance of inter-corporate acquisitions.
To gain additional insights, we modify equation (6) to allow for heterogeneity in the effect of the tax reform with regard to the induced tax cuts. This is achieved by replacing P OST it with the tax rate change caused by the corporate capital gains tax reduction, ∆τ 
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Estimation results are displayed in columns (3) and (4) of Table 6 . Again, the coefficients are positive and highly significant. Quantitatively, these results indicate that the presence of a corporate capital gains tax exemption increases the ratio of the number of type-C and type-I deals by a factor of 1.03 (or 2.9%) per percentage point of tax rate reduction. An almost identical coefficient in column (4) shows that these findings are robust to accounting for coinciding reductions in the capital gains tax rate on the individual shareholder level. Thus, inter-corporate acquisition activity does not only react to the mere presence of a capital gains tax reduction but is also determined by the magnitude of such an exemption.
Finally, we can use our estimates to compute the potential efficiency loss resulting from the taxation of capital gains in inter-corporate M&As. The efficiency loss is defined as the foregone gain from a failed M&A deal. We use acquisition premia Estimation with PPML. In regressions (1) the dependent variable is the number of M&A deals per year and country in which an non-corporate vendor sells shares in a target firm residing in the same country and receives a consideration that involves a cash payment. Otherwise the specification is identical to column (1) in Table 4 . In regressions (2)- (4) the dependent variable is the number of M&A deals per year, country and vendor type in which the vendor sells shares in a target firm residing in the same country and receives a consideration that involves a cash payment. Regression (2) includes a country-specific dummy variable P OST . Regression (3) repeats this regression using the absolute change in the corporate capital gains income tax generated by the reform instead of a post-reform dummy. Regression (4) replicates the results using the absolute change in the difference between corporate capital gains income taxes and individual capital gains taxes generated by the reform. All regression include country-and year-fixed effects as well as year-vendor-type-fixed effects. Cluster robust standard (clustered at the country-vendor-type level) errors are provided in parentheses.Stars behind coefficients indicate the significance level, , * 10%, * * 5%, * * * 1%.
(1) (2) (3) Pseudo reported in Zephyr as a market-related measure of this gain and compute country-and sector-specific acquisition premia for the sample period. We then consider a decrease in the corporate capital gains rate to zero in 2013 and use our coefficient estimate from Table 5 to evaluate the effect at the yearly mean of the deal volume. This provides us with a country-and sector specific estimate of the yearly deal volume foregone due to capital gains taxation from which we back out the efficiency loss using the previously computed acquisition premia. Second, using international data our results suggest a lock-in effect on intercorporate acquisitions that is smaller than previously estimated in time-series studies for individual shareholder taxation (e.g. Ayers et al., 2007) . This may partly reflect the use of different samples but also indicates that, on the global scale, corporations are less reactive to capital gains taxes in their acquisition behavior than individuals.
One reason for this may be that capital gains taxation affects individual shareholders' income directly whereas managers who take decisions at the corporate level are only indirectly affected via the impact of annual firm yields on their reputation and can take a more long-term view on acquisitions.
Third, our results imply that corporate tax reforms that reduce capital gains taxes may be revenue neutral in a similar way as has been previously suggested for the case of shareholder taxation (e.g. Feldstein et al., 1980) . Although the increase in acquisition activity may not fully compensate the revenue loss, in particular if capital gains are fully exempt, the resulting efficiency gains would still raise government revenue from taxing higher corporate profits. This table replicates Table 4 using weighted nearest neighbor interpolation to compute the time between deal announcement and completion. Distance d ij is measured in absolute number of days between the announcement dates of two deals i and j. We include the five nearest neighbors, use power distance weights with an exponent α = 3 and row-normalize weights so that the weight for observation j within the 5 nearest neighbors is given by
ij . Estimation with PPML. The dependent variable is the number of M&A deals per year and country in which a corporate vendor sells shares in a target firm residing in the same country and receives a consideration that involves a cash payment. Regression (1) contains the main specification. In regression (2), countries which are referred to as preferred holding locations are excluded. Regression (3) excludes all country-year pairs with zero acquisitions. Cluster robust standard (clustered at the country level) errors are provided in parentheses. Stars behind coefficients indicate the significance level, * 10%, * * 5%, * * * 1%.
(1) Estimation with PPML. In regressions (1) the dependent variable is the sum of all values of M&A deals per year and country in which a non-corporate vendor sells shares in a target firm residing in the same country and receives a consideration that involves a cash payment. Otherwise the specification is identical to column (1) in Table 4 . In regressions (2)-(4) the dependent variable is the sum of all values of M&A deals per year, country and vendor type in which the vendor sells shares in a target firm residing in the same country and receives a consideration that involves a cash payment. Regression (2) includes a country-specific dummy variable P OST . Regression (3) repeats this regression using the absolute change in the corporate capital gains income tax generated by the reform instead of a post-reform dummy. Regression (4) replicates the results using the absolute change in the difference between corporate capital gains income taxes and individual capital gains taxes generated by the reform. All regression include country-and year-fixed effects as well as year-vendor-type-fixed effects. Cluster robust standard (clustered at the country-vendor-type level) errors are provided in parentheses.Stars behind coefficients indicate the significance level, , * 10%, * * 5%, * * * 1%.
(1) -2.3e+08 -2.2e+08 -2.2e+08
Computing the Efficiency Loss
In the following we describe the computation of the country-and sector-specific yearly efficiency loss in USD displayed in Table 7 . The four main sectors are defined according to SIC codes: Mining and Construction (1000-1799), Manufacturing (2000-3999),
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (6000-6799) and Services (7000-8999). We first compute country-and sector specific gains from M&A deals for the period 2002-2013.
For this purpose we use acquisition premia reported in the Zephyr data base. The acquisition premium of a deal is defined as the deal value less the market price of the target one day prior to the announcement divided by the latter. For each country and sector, we compute the mean of all premia in percent. Noting that our estimates in Ta- ble 5 suggest that a decrease of the corporate capital gains rate by 1 percentage points raises acquisition activity in terms of total deal volume by 1.1%, the yearly efficiency loss Γ is in country i and sector s is then given by Γ is = τ CG is × 0.011 × n is × πis 100+πis , where τ CG is is the corporate capital gains tax rate used in the main regression, n is is the average deal volume per year and π is is the average acquisition premium.
